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The private accumulation process central to capitalism always
has been, and continues to be, contested.1 Nonetheless, it is fair to
say that, these days, the debate about the theoretical acceptability
of our political economy is a muted one, certainly in our part of the
world. Capitalism's hegemony seems well-secured, especially
after the dramatic events in the East European bloc and the clear
changes in directions in China and (to a lesser extent) Vietnam, as
well as in Nicaragua and Cuba. 2 This does not mean, however,
'Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School. This is the revised version of a paper
presented at the 24th Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, held at the
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, on October 21-22,1994.
1 Marxists reject it because it is based on the exploitation of labour, rendering workers into
wage slaves by means of the pretence of freedom of contract. Various schools of feminists
object to it, either because they too see it as a class-based system which, in addition, is a
gendered system or because, while they do not take the class analysis approach, capitalism
embodies the evils of hierarchical relationships; see for instance Marilyn Waring, If
Women Counted: A New Feminist Economics (San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1988);
Dorothy E. Smith, "Women, The Family and Corporate Capitalism" in Mary Lee Steph-
enson, ed., Women in Canada, (General Publishing, 1977), p. 17; Marion G. Crain,
"Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labour" (1991), 89
Mich. L. Rev. 1155. For an overview, see Kathleen A. Lahey and Sarah W. Salter,
"Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From Classism to Feminism"
(1985), 23 O.H.L.J. 543. Some legal-political analysts argue that one of the major presup-
positions of the private wealth accumulation system, viz. that wealth maximization is a
value in its own right, is unacceptable to them. For a convenient overview, see R.
Dworkin, "Is Wealth a Value?" (1980), 9 J. Leg. Stud. 191; A.T. Kronman, "Wealth
Maximization as a Normative Principle" (1980), 9 J. Leg. Stud. 227 and the response by
R. Posner, "The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman" (1980), 9 J.
Leg. Stud. 243. Some theologians are concerned because capitalism is based on
selfishness and greed and is capable of leading to inequalities which are hard to justify.
See, for example, the Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs for the Canadian
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical Reflection on the Economic Crisis, 1983. For a
discussion of some of these and other writings, see H.J. Glasbeek, "Commercial Morality
through Capitalist Law: Limited Possibilities" (1993), 27 Th~mis 263.
2 All of this has led to a much-cited declaration that this kind of debate has come to an end.
See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History", National Interest 1, Summer 1989. Of
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that what people continue to perceive as the contradictory,
oppressive or immoral outcomes of working capitalism, do not
provide the bases for diverse forms of resistance. Typically,
however, the ensuing battles are fought at a more concrete level,
that is, where the activities which embody and concretize the
values of capitalism take place. As the corporation is a legally
engineered device which has become one of the most important
working tools employed in the furtherance of the accumulation
process, these struggles always put both its raisons d'6tre and its
legitimacy under scrutiny.
One of the key tenets of capitalism is that private individuals are
expected to maximize the opportunities provided by their
resources and abilities. Guided by rational self-interest, they will
calculate the potential benefits and costs of their activities. They
know that the fruits of their endeavours will be theirs to keep.
Similarly, if they fail, they understand that the losses are to be
borne by them. They must pay for the debts they leave and are
obliged to set right any wrong done to others as they seek to
maximize their opportunities. This attribution of responsibility,
both for one's own welfare and for the results of the behaviour
engaged in pursuit of it, supports political values which go a long
way towards off-setting the alleged amoral and immoral aspects of
the private accumulation system.
The personal and legal accountability of individuals for their
self-promoting economic acts, that is, for acting as Rational
Economic Men, reflects the logic of a legal-political system based
on the principles of de jure equality, individual sovereignty and the
primacy of the exercise of free will. These liberal political values
are seen as being integral to the political economic model which
we call capitalist relations of production. Our legal system has
helped develop this kind of political economy and reflects and
continues to promote its values.
Thus it is that when a person engages in business and, say,
pollutes the environment, that person will be held personally
responsible for the damage that has been done. Similarly, if the
same event occurs as a result of the conduct of business by a firm
constituted by a number of joint-venturers or partners, the firm
course, this is not the first time such a triumph has been announced. Cf. Daniel Bell, The
End of Ideology (Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1960); and see also Chaim I. Waxman,
Ed., The End ofIdeology Debate (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1969).
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and each of the partners may be held accountable for the damage.
The logic is straightforward: these people invested their capital
and made efforts to make a personal profit; the economic model,
as well as the political one based on it, expects them to be
personally responsible for the outcomes of their conduct. The law
endorses these understandings.
As is well known, all of this changes if the same investors pool
their resources to form a corporation and the corporation engages
in the same conduct with the same harmful results. This time the
investors will not be held directly responsible for the damage done
by the business they set up to maximize their opportunities.
Something has happened. The doctrine of separate legal person-
ality, an essential characteristic of the corporation, a vehicle
designed to facilitate capitalist activities, has put a protective
shield around investors.
It is not an impermeable shield. If the corporation's injurious
activities require compensation to be paid and/or clean-up activ-
ities to take place, the corporation, as the legal person respon-
sible, may be held to account. This, in turn, may well reduce the
value of the shareholders' investment in the corporation and, if
this imposition of enterprise liability leads to the insolvency of the
corporation, may result in the loss of the whole of the share-
holders' investment. But no more than that. This is the well-
known consequence of another characteristic of this vehicle
designed to facilitate capitalist activities, namely, limited liability.3
Much effort has been expended on countering the attacks on the
legitimacy of the corporate vehicle which arose as soon as the
possibility of limited liability was put on the legislative table. 4 In
more recent times, the law and economics scholars have provided
the most persuasive and sophisticated arguments to justify limited
liability. Basically, they argue that economic efficiency supports
the grant of limited liability to investors .5
3 There are circumstances in which the corporate veil will be pierced and major share-
holders and corporate actors will be held personally responsible. The need for special
treatment emphasizes the point made in the text.
4 The London Times referred to the idea as the Rogue's Charter; May 25, 1824. Aubrey L.
Diamond, "Corporate Personality and Limited Liability" in T. Orhnial, ed., Limited
Liability and the Corporation (London, Croom Helm, 1982), quotes J.K. McCollish as
saying, in 1859, that "[wjere Parliament to set about devising means for the encour-
agement of speculation, over-trading and swindling, what better could it do?". For a
succinct and thorough summation of the literature dealing with the struggles arising out of
the principle of limited liability, see J. Ziegel, "Is Incorporation (with Limited Liability)
Too Easily Available?" (1991), 31 Cah. de droit 1075 at p. 1077.
5 While economic efficiency has several meanings and the reasoning varies accordingly,
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Still, despite these very plausible arguments, the suggestion of
lack of legitimacy which arises from the shielding effects of the use
of the corporate vehicle has never been totally resolved. The
difference in treatment of those who invest in, and become
members of, a corporation, as opposed to that meted out to other
kinds of risk-takers and risk-creators, remains an irritant to many
people precisely because the tenets of liberalism demand that, if
the fetters of personal responsibility are to be put on individuals in
order to serve the collective good, all individuals should be equally
fettered. This is especially strongly felt if the restraints are
stringent ones. This draws attention to one aspect of the
imposition of legal responsibility which economic-based efficiency
arguments find it awkward to address.
When a risk-taker and risk-creator causes a loss to another, the
nature of the loss and the way in which it was inflicted may lead us
to demand more than that the loss be made good. For instance, a
breach of a contractual obligation could be set right by compen-
sation and/or specific performance. Sometimes, if the breach is the
result of a bad practice, say, a failure to monitor the quality of the
goods or services rendered, it might lead to an administrative
sanction being imposed on the violator in addition to requiring
him/her to make reparation for the harm inflicted. Such a sanction
could take the form of a reprimand, the suspension of a licence, a
fine and even imprisonment. And, if the violation of the contract
is due to, say, a fraudulent or deceitful practice, punitive damages
may be exacted and/or a criminal sanction may be imposed against
the perpetrator, in addition to the payment of compensation to the
victim.
While it is not always analytically clear which remedy or
sanction ought to be attached to what conduct, it is clear that we,
as members of a liberal democratic capitalist society, want to have
all these possibilities open to us. There are occasions when the
some of the main arguments on offer include: limited liability allows investments to be
made across a wide spectrum of enterprises by individual wealth owners and enables the
development of an effective securities market; the limiting of investors' liability is a cost
which the investing classes often would be able to impose on others even if they had not
been granted limited liability. Here the notion is that these "others" are people who might
have, for the most part, entered into voluntary agreements with the investing share-
holders in a corporation. The truly involuntary creditor, therefore, always has presented
an intractable problem for the proponents of limited liability. Quaere: how is a line to be
drawn between voluntary and involuntary creditors? Proponents of the scheme deem
more people to be voluntary creditors than do its detractors.
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publicized personal stigmatization and punishment of a
wrongdoer are seen as appropriate remedies for the violation of
one of our consensually generated limitations on the individual's
right to do as s/he pleases.
It is obvious that a corporation, like any human being, may be
made to pay punitive damages, be subjected to an administrative
sanction and even be criminally convicted. Such punitive sanctions
may very well have denunciatory and condemnatory effects, yet
this may not satisfy our perceived needs in the same way as the
imposition of punishment on human beings does. This is so
because a personalized sanction satisfies some of our more visceral
notions which demand that, on occasion, there should be personal
damnation, personal shame, personal hurt and humbling
contriteness. The difficulty of attaining these goals when corpora-
tions, rather than their owners, are punished, is manifest. The
disillusionment this may spawn is likely to be deepened by the fact
that the twin key attributes of a corporation - its legal personality
and limited liability for its shareholders - provide the investors
with an incentive not to take responsibility. They are induced to be
passive profiteers who, rationally, will rarely show much interest
in how the corporate vehicle in which they have invested pursues
profit.
This is not to say that individual actors within the corporate
envelope cannot be legally stigmatized and corporally punished.
Employees, agents and officers may be subjected to such
sanctions, just as the employees, agents and officers of businesses
run by sole entrepreneurs or joint-venturers can be. 6 But, unlike
the investors in an unincorporated business, individuals who
invest equity capital continue to escape the direct application of
state disapproval while enjoying the full membership benefits
bestowed by the corporate form. It is in this setting that the
notoriety given to the recent convictions of high profile directors
(Bata) and the mass resignation of directors of large publicly
traded corporations because they might be held civilly responsible
for corporate conduct (the directors of the subsidiaries of PWA, the
directors of Westar), can be understood. A different class of
people than usual was being held responsible for corporate
conduct.
6 While they may be contractually indemnified or protected by insurance, this protection
will not always be available and will not save them from imprisonment if they are
convicted of an offence.
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That this was seen as a new departure can be gleaned from such
headlines as: "New challenges for directors";7 "Don't drive
directors from boards"; 8 "Liability chills heads for liability
freeze"; 9 "Why would anyone be a director?"; 10 and "The Fall
Guys". 1' There was a feeling that something important was
brewing and it was something the world of corporate directors and
their supporters did not like. This is not surprising. From their
perspective, their lives seemed to have become markedly more
risky. What is perhaps more intriguing is that this position, namely
that the increasing personal responsibility of corporate directors
was an unwelcome development, has attracted considerable
scholarly support. This raises many issues, some of which this
article seeks to explore.
The starting point is that there is nothing legally new about
holding corporate directors personally responsible for harms done
and costs incurred arising out of corporate activities. If anything is
new it is the number of situations in which, and the kinds of actions
for which, directors are now potentially personally responsible. I
will argue that the expansion of the ambit of responsibility does
not of itself raise a conceptual difficulty for the legal model of the
corporation, although the wisdom of these developments may well
be questioned. It is done most insightfully by the theorists of the
law and economics school. They issue warnings about the ineffi-
ciencies which may result from the seemingly out-of-control
expansion of directors' responsibility. Their arguments are elegant
and plausible and are likely to have a good deal of resonance with
policy-makers. 12 But in the absence of clear empirical evidence to
support them, the arguments that the increasing imposition of
personal responsibility on corporate directors is bound to be
inefficient are not conclusive. The debate about the analytical
appropriateness and the economic utility of increased director
responsibility, therefore, is not likely to go away and will lead to
some intriguing twists and turns.
The imposition of direct personal responsibility on corporate
7 Financial Post, July 23, 1992, p. 8.
8 Editorial, Financial Post, August 10, 1992, p. 31.
9 T. Corcoran, Globe and Mail, July 31,1992, p. 2 .
10 C. Lakshman, Financial Post, July 3,1992, p. 5.
11 W. Gerard, Toronto Star, March 14, 1993.
12 Supported, as they will be, by the very important and influential people who believe that
it is their ox which is being gored.
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directors, that is, those persons who, in class terms, are most
proximate to the investors who are shielded from direct personal
responsibility, might be seen as going a long way towards
countering the attacks on the legitimacy of the corporate vehicle.
In particular, it might relieve some of the difficulties posed for the
proponents of the system by the all-too-frequent, non-efficient use
of the closely held corporation. The twin features of limited
liability and separate legal personality are easily manipulated, and
often are. This has led some law and economic scholars to argue
that, perhaps, the grant of limited liability to these kinds of
business vehicles is not warranted. 13 Holding directors, who often
are major shareholders in such a corporation, personally respon-
sible would advance the cause of legitimacy which the shields
provided by the corporate vehicle for investors tend to undermine.
Resistance by the law and economic scholars to the increase in
direct personal responsibility of directors, therefore, might renew
the very questioning these scholars, more than anyone else, have
done so much to dampen.
A (necessarily) speculative argument will be offered in this
article as to why these theorists may be putting themselves in the
uncomfortable position of reawakening what they have spent so
much effort trying to put to sleep. In part, the argument is that
these people have a set of unarticulated fears which have to do
with the potential reconstruction of the markets by dint of this
imposition of personal director responsibility. It might lead to
reconstructions not empathetic with capital's fiercely held views
that this is a time for deregulation rather than regulation.
Relatedly, the argument continues (hesitantly), there also may be
apprehension that while the direct imposition of responsibility on
corporate directors is notionally compatible with the recent efforts
put into saving the legitimacy of the unidimensional maximizer-of-
profits corporate governance model favoured by the law and
economics scholars, it may be too much of a good thing.
13 Examples of what is becoming a burgeoning literature are P. Halpern, M. Trebilcock and
S. Turnbull, "An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law" (1980),
30 U.T.L.J. 117; H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, "Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts" (1991), 100 Yale L.J. 1878. For a discussion which also
identifies the questions the abolitionists have raised but not answered, see Ziegel, supra,
footnote 4. For a study which suggests a widespread and conscious use of the separate
legal personality trait to avoid liability, see A. Ringleb & S. Wiggins, "Liability and
Large Scale, Long-Term Hazards" (1990), 98J. Pol. Eco. 574.
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II. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS: TWO APPROACHES
1. The Legal Model
The Canadian statutory regime assigns a crucial role to the
board of directors, which is elected by the shareholders. The
board is to manage (or supervise, in Ontario) the management of
the business affairs of the corporation. 14 While the directors are
elected by the shareholders, the directors' powers are not
delegated ones. They are written into the statute. Even though in
large corporations the board of directors is not an operational
body, as a matter of law the corporate business can be carried on
only as a result of the board of directors' decisions at properly
constituted meetings. In practice, broad policy is determined by
the board of directors and a system designed to have others opera-
tionalize the policies is instituted. From this idealized perspective,
the daily functions and activities conducted by the corporation are
mandated and overseen by the directors.
In carrying out their duties, the directors are to be guided by
very widely stated statutorily imposed duties: the duty to act in
good faith and in the best interests of the corporation and to act
with the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person
would exercise in comparable circumstances. Over time, these
provisions have been given a jurisprudential content shaping the
way in which the board of directors is to exercise statutory powers.
Obvious though the point may be, it is pertinent to this discussion
to note that violations of these duties make directors personally
responsible. 15 Over and above these general checks on the
exercise of the directors' governmental-type power which inheres
in the statutory model, there are specific rules which make
directors personally responsible if they use the power in a way
which imperils the corporation, even though, notionally, such uses
of power might be thought to offend the general strictures to act in
good faith and in the best interests of the corporation (and/or with
the care, diligence and skill required of a director). These precise
proscriptions include voting for a resolution to pay out or lend
corporate money or to enter into certain identified transactions or
exchanges if a reasonable person might have understood that
these actions could threaten the solvency of the corporation.16
14 Canadian Business Corporations Act ("CBCA"), R.S.C. 1985, c. C.44, s. 102; Ontario
Business Corporations Act ("OBCA"), R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 115.15 CBCA, s. 122(3); OBCA s. 134(4); see also CBCA ss. 251 to 252; OBCA ss. 258 to 261.
16 See, eg., CBCA s. 118; OBCA s. 130. Apparently it is not enough that these kinds of corpo-
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For the purposes of this article, this bare sketch of the legal
model of the directors' powers and duties is offered to make the
simple point that directors have had considerable exposure to
personal liability for some time. This suggests that there has been
a tacit agreement that: (i) the imposition of these kinds of respon-
sibilities does not act as a serious barrier to the recruitment of
competent boards of directors, and (ii) that it does not, in any
important sense, undermine the legal understandings of the
separate legal personality of the corporation. Thus, the contem-
porary anxiety about the increase in directors' personal responsi-
bilities must stem from the fact that a host of qualitatively different
kinds of responsibilities are being imposed. 17 One obvious
distinction between the "new" responsibilities and the ones which
were written into the statutory model long ago is that the new
responsibilities make directors personally liable for acts which
impinge on persons external to the corporation. To make this
distinction a meaningful one, the argument must run that this set
of responsibilities to outsiders does not fit very well with the legal
model of the corporation set out above. Such an argument can be
made.
The reasoning is that the corporation is a full legal person but,
physically and mentally, it requires human beings to conduct its
business on its behalf. When this happens, such human beings act
not as the corporation's agent, but as the corporation. As Welling
says of a salesman entering into a contract for the corporation:
"He [the salesman] was not acting as himself, on behalf of his
corporate principal; as a person in his own right he was not
involved at all."' 18 That is, the salesman was a tool for these
purposes, not a person. Starting from this stringent approach, it is
but a short step to argue that, inside a corporation, a director may
owe duties to the corporation in respect of her/his conduct, but
that, when the director causes the corporation to interact with
outsiders, the relationships and obligations which ensue are those
ration-imperilling activities could be corrected by shareholders themselves when they
find out about the dereliction of the directors' general duty to the corporation. An
additional, positive and detailed personal responsibility has been imposed because this is
more efficient than waiting for shareholders to learn about the wrong.
17 And perhaps from the fact that, even though directors have always owed a large number
of duties to the corporation, until relatively recently directors, as opposed to functioning
managers, were rarely sued by disaffected members of the corporation.
18 B. Welling, Corporate Law in Canada; The Governing Principles, 2nd ed. (Toronto,
Butterworths, 1991), p. 115.
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between the corporation and the outsiders, not between the
director and the outsiders. 19
As a consequence of this conceptual framework, the question of
whether or not to impose tortious liability on directors for acts
done as directors has proved troublesome for the courts. In
Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal has suggested that, in cases
which do not require proof of some kind of advertence or intent,
such as breaches of copyright, patent violations, or corresponding
torts, such as passing-off, the director of a corporation will be held
tortiously liable if s/he had participated in a knowing, wilful way in
the decision-making which led to the alleged wrongful corporate
conduct. 20 The Federal Court of Appeal reasoned that evidence of
some deliberateness was required because otherwise a director
engaged in routine tasks would be held personally liable, thereby
negating the separate legal personality model of the corporation.
In practice, this would make the conduct of business through the
corporate form a relatively useless vehicle for one person and
other small enterprises. And, the Federal Court of Appeal
reasoned, as the legal model did not differentiate between closely
held corporations and larger and more widely traded ones, even
though the impact on the utility of incorporation would be far less
dramatic in the larger corporate setting, the same principle ought
to apply in those cases. 21
The English courts do not require as much evidence of a wilful
or deliberate act by the directors. They seem to be willing to hold a
director personally liable in tort where a director has either
expressly or impliedly directed or procured the tortious act.22 The
19 This is neatly illustrated by the well-known criminal law cases which hold that where the
corporation's guilty mind is established because of a finding that a corporate director/-
manager had the appropriate state of mind, the director/manager should not be held
guilty of having conspired with the corporation: see R. v. Canadian Dredge & Dock Co.
Ltd. (1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 314, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662 at p. 683 (Estey J.); R. v.
McDonnell, [1966] 1 All. E.R. 193; R. v. LC.R. Haulage Ltd, [1944] K.B. 551. This does
not mean that the director/manager cannot be held responsible for a crime committed by
her/himself in respect of the same conduct: see infira, text at footnote 29.2 0 Mentmore Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandise Manufacturing Co. Inc.
(1978),89 D.L.R. (3d) 195,40 C.P.R. (2d) 164 (Fed. C.A.).
21 Jbid, at p. 202.
2 See the much-cited judgment of Atkin L.J. in Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Ciryl
Theatrical Syndicate Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 1 (C.A.) at pp. 14 et seq.; Yuille v. B. & B.
Fisheries (Leigh) Ltd., [19581 2 Lloyds Rep. 596; C. Evans and Sons Ltd v. Spritebrand
Ltd., [1985] 2 All E.R. 415 (C.A.); contrast White Horse Distillers Ltd. v. Gregson
Associates Ltd., [1984] R.P.C. 61.
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difficulty of drawing a line between those situations in which the
corporation, acting through a director/manager, should be the
only person responsible and those in which the corporate conduct
has been made that of the director/manager by deliberate, or some
lesser form of express or implied adoption, is plain.
The cases seem to be somewhat easier when the tort requires
some measure of advertence or proof of intent because a director
with the appropriate knowledge and/or state of mind might more
easily be seen to have adopted the wrongful conduct as her/his
own. 23 Occasionally the courts will finesse the issue by arguing that
the director was not acting as such at all but was acting in a totally
different capacity. 24 Some of these types of arguments are concep-
tually troublesome. In McFadden,25 self-promoting directors were
said not to be acting within the scope of their authority when, as a
result of the directors' decision, the corporation breached its
contract with one of its employees. They were held personally
responsible in tort for inducing a breach of contract. Given the
starting point, namely that the corporate acts are the result of
formally correct decision-making by directors, this line of
argument is much more convincing where the directors - often
major shareholders - use the corporate vehicle to commit a
wrong.26 Nevertheless, it may be difficult to draw the line between
a director/manager's act taken bona fide for the corporation's
benefit and one which is not.27
At the end of the day, however, it is clear that the courts are
willing to treat directors as persons in their own right when it can
23 For example, in Wah Tat Bank Ltd. v. Chan Cheng Kum, [1975] 2 All E.R. 257 (P.C.)
(Chairman of the corporation agreed with X to convert goods meant for X's clients).
24 See Rainham Chemical Works Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co. Ltd., [1921] 2 A.C. 465
(H.L.). (Directors held responsible as occupiers of the premises not as directors qua
directors).
25 McFadden v. 481782 Ontario Ltd. (1984), 47 O.R. (2d) 134, 27 B.L.R. 173 (H.C.J.).
26 Perhaps this is the best rationalization of difficult cases like Einhorn v. Westmount Invest-
ments Ltd. (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 509, 73 W.W.R. 161 (Sask. C.A.).
27 See Schouls v. Canadian Meat Processing Corp. (1983), 147 D L.R. (3d) 81,41 O.R. (2d)
600 (H.C.J.) and the critique of the decision in W. Augustus Richardson, "Making an
End Run around the Corporate Veil: The Tort of Inducing Breach of Contract" (1984), 5
Adv. 103, 108 et seq. Richardson suggests that the line between bonafide conduct by the
director and conduct which is not bonafide can be drawn with some precision, but this is
problematic. See Lehndorff Canadian Pension Properties Ltd. v. Davis & Co. (1987), 10
B.C.L.R. (2d) 342, 39 C.C.L.T. 196 (B.C.S.C.) and compare case law dealing with
criminal conspiracy, cited supra, footnote 19. For a general account of this area of
tortious liability, see G.H.L. Fridman, "Personal Tort Liability of Company Directors"
(1992), 5 Canter. L.R. 41.
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be said that they made the conduct of the corporation they
initiated their own in some way. While there are many evidentiary
problems, analytically the courts feel confident that they will not
be undermining the legal corporate governance model when they
hold directors liable in this way. This is also reflected in the way in
which these issues have been dealt with in the criminal law.
It is well-known that the attribution of criminal responsibility to
a corporation rests on the Crown's ability to identify a person who
can be said to be the guiding mind and will of the corporation who
had the necessary intent when the act was committed on behalf of
the corporation. 28 It is also established law that where the corpora-
tion's criminal behaviour was engaged in by a person who can be
characterized as the guiding mind of the corporation and that
person had the capacity to make the conduct his/her own, either
the corporation or that person can be held to be the principal
criminal offender. 
29
In short, the legal model of the corporation has permitted the
imposition of responsibility and liability on directors/managers for
corporate conduct which has inflicted losses and harms on the
external world. 30 The legal responsibility of directors has not been
limited to the general duties of good faith and loyalty and of
having to act in the best interest of the corporation with the
requisite degrees of care, skill, and diligence specified by the
governing statutes. 31 From this legalistic perspective, the hue and
cry which greeted the decision in Bata,32 where managers who
were deemed to have made polluting acts of the corporations their
own because they had the knowledge and the capacity to do
something to prevent the harm, seems to be exaggerated.
Indeed, even within the corporate statutes there is evidence that
the legislatures desire directors to be held responsible to outsiders
for acts done on behalf of the corporation. Presumably, the
28 See Canadian Dredge, supra footnote 19.
29 See R. v. Fell (1981), 64 C.C.C. (2d) 456 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Shamrock Chemicals Ltd.
(1989), 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 315 (Ont. D.C.); R. v. Dawson City Hotels Ltd. (1986), 1 Y.R.
3 (Yukon C.A.). The individual can be convicted of aiding and abetting the principal (the
corporation), contrast criminal conspiracy; see footnote 19.
30 See Ziegel, supra, footnote 4, at p. 1089, where he argues that "the legal doctrines
developed by the courts in respect of corporate governance presuppose that the general
principles of contract, agency, tort and other branches of law will continue to apply" to
those whose conduct normally is identified to be that of the corporation.
31 See text at footnotes 14, 15.
32 R. v. Bata Industries Ltd. (1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 394,9 O.R. (3d) 329 (Prov. Div.).
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assumption is that this can be done without imperilling the legal
governance model created by those statutes. I have in mind partic-
ularly those provisions which make directors of a corporation
responsible for unpaid employee wages. 33 Inasmuch as
employees, from the legal model perspective, are not members of
the corporation, these are liabilities to outsiders with which boards
of directors have had to live for a long time.34 Again, viewed solely
from a legalistic perspective, the alarm created by the possibility
that the directors of Westar and the directors of the subsidiaries of
PWA might have to meet the unpaid bills owed to these corpora-
tions' employees was also exaggerated.
In sum, the idea that directors may be held personally liable for
harms and costs inflicted while acting on behalf of the corporation,
either when they have been given a specific duty to discharge
and/or they have made a statutory or common law standard-
violating corporate act their own, is far from new. Since both legis-
latures and courts support the notion that there should be this kind
of responsibility, they are promoting the principle that individuals
should be held responsible for their own conduct. Furthermore,
they seem to believe that this goal can be achieved without
seriously undermining the separate legal personality of the corpo-
ration. If there is a problem, then, because of the large number of
recent high profile situations in which directors have been held
responsible, it appears to be one because there seem to be simply
more of these kinds of obligations.
33 See CBCA S. 119; OBCA s. 131. Additional statutory obligations to meet debts owed to
employees have had to be imposed under labour standards legislation to remedy the
perceived shortcomings of the corporate statutes. This perception of failure is related to
one of the arguments made below about the impetus for the increased imposition of
direct statutory responsibility on directors.
34 One rationale offered is that workers are vulnerable creditors of the corporation and that
directors are in a position, and ought, to guard their interests. Vulnerability is not a term
of art in the world of Rational Economic Men. Indeed, the suggestion that there may be
something involuntary about the contract of employment is the very point which Marxists
make (supra, footnote 1) and which contractarians always meet with fierce resistance.
Compare this with the imposition of (somewhat constrained, but real) civil (as well as
criminal) responsibility on directors to outsiders for misrepresentation in a prospectus
under the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. s. 5 (s. 126, see also s. 127 et seq.) This burden is
not seen as inappropriate. This may be so because the imposition of responsibility
requires some showing of negligence on the part of directors. But the more negative view
of directors' liability for unpaid wages may be attributable to other factors as well, such as
the class relations between directors and shareholders (or would-be shareholders) as
opposed to those between directors and workers; see the discussion in Part V of this
article.
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There is however another explanation, and this is that the
quality of this increasing number of obligations differs to such an
extent from the pre-existing directors' responsibilities 35 that not
only is the legal model of the corporation coming under pressure,
but the usefulness of the corporation as a vehicle through which to
do business also may be imperilled. It is the last possibility, that of
the threat to efficiency, which may be central to the law and
economics critique of the developing personal responsibility of
directors.
2. The Efficiency Model
The logic of law and economic scholarship is that the enterprise
should bear the costs and fines associated with debts incurred by
the enterprise and harms inflicted by it.36 The argument is that the
managers (which term seems to include directors) of the corpo-
ration are merely agents of the investors, that is, the shareholders,
and that to hold these agents personally responsible could make
them inefficient agents if they were given reasons to start to think
more about their own interests than they already do. 37 The danger
to be avoided, then, is that these agents, in order to escape
personal liabilities, will not take some of the potential wealth-
creating risks their principals have appointed them to take on their
behalf.
35 This is how the fuss around the Bata case, supra, footnote 32, can be better understood.
The concern is that directors/managers are being held liable not only for wanton, delib-
erate conduct, but also for routine, if careless, conduct. See R. McLeod & B. McMeekin,
"R. v. Bata Industries Ltd: Directors Beware" (1992), 2 J.E.L.P. 313. The anxiety
occasioned by Bata may be exaggerated, but the argument that the nature, rather than
the number, of director responsibilities is changing in a significant way has merit; see
infra, Part IV of this article.
36 The term "enterprise liability" seems to be preferred to that of corporate liability in this
literature. It tends to bolster the argument in the text which follows that, to these
theorists, the separate legal personality of the corporation is not a significant issue. It
does so by suggesting that agency theorists do not take the idea of the corporation as a
closed association as seriously as do the more traditional legal model theorists. To the
latter, only certain persons can be members of the corporation, even though others work
for it and/or contract with it. To the agency theorists, the business organization is a series
of contractual relations, making each person who is contractually related in some way,
potentially an integral part of a co-ordinated business, that is, of an enterprise.
37 As Rational Economic Men they may already concern themselves too much with their
own interests for the taste of the agency theorists. This is a reference to the well-known
problem of agency costs, costs manifested in "looting" and "shirking" by managers at the
expense of the shareholders whom they are supposed to serve.
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What is striking about this approach is that it does not object to
director/manager liability because this may undermine the
separate legal personality of the corporation concept. To the
contract-nexus theorizing of the corporation 38 the separate legal
personality of a corporation is a useful device, but no more. 39 The
resistance to personal responsibility for the corporation's directors
and managers, therefore, is not based on the argument that it
might run counter to the notion of identification of the directors
with the corporation, the notion which gives the corporation its
personateness.
The contractarians, then, take a functional approach to the role
of directors. The directors and managers of the corporation, being
the investors' agents, have a responsibility to shareholders and
their investment. Logically, this approach suggests (although not
incontrovertibly) that the agents' principals, the shareholders,
should be held responsible for acts done on their behalf. 4° But, at
this point, the contractarians turn round and accept, whole-
heartedly, another feature of the legal model of the corporation:
limited liability for shareholders. Of course, they do not embrace
this concept because it has a long legal tradition. Rather, their
argument is that limited liability provides a most useful incentive
to would-be investors, providing them with a loss-spreading
mechanism which is likely to lead to greater overall economic
welfare and well-functioning capital markets. 41 Thus, share-
38 This is just as true of the institutional variants of the contractarian theories.
39 In this sense, the approach to legal personality is not unlike that taken by fiction theory
adherents, except that the state registration system is characterized as a mere enabling
agency rather than a creative force. This approach reinforces the argument that corpora-
tions, being privately generated vehicles, ought not to be restrained or constrained by the
state unless it is proved, in efficiency terms, that it is necessary to do so.
40 There is a counter-argument: the principals are too far removed from the agents to be
held responsible for their conduct. Shares frequently change hands and shareholders are
not expected to take an interest in the way in which share values are enhanced. This
counter-argument has some, but not total, appeal; consider the doctrine of vicarious
liability in tort and the approach taken by some u.s. courts to the criminal responsibility
of corporations for the acts of very lowly placed employees.
41 See supra, footnote 5. In an unlimited liability scheme, the value of a share of any one
firm would be different to different investors because of the varying personal vulnerabil-
ities of its holders. Further, a paradox would arise because the less assets an investor had,
the more risky the kinds of investments s/he made might be. Both these difficulties are
avoided by limited liability, making for more reliable capital markets. The arguments are
well rehearsed; see F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, "Limited Liability and the Corpo-
ration" (1985), 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89; H. Manne, "Our Two Corporation Systems: Law
and Economics" (1967), 53 Va. L. Rev. 259. For a useful summation and evaluation of
the arguments, see T. Gabaldon, "The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflec-
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holders, the real owners of the business, are not to be held directly
and fully responsible for losses because this would be a disin-
centive to welfare-creating investments. But, as seen, it is also
argued that it would be counter-productive if these investors'
agents were held personally responsible. In the name of efficiency,
it appears to be difficult to hold any human being responsible. This
is a curious position to take and, therefore, a reasoned and spirited
defence has had to be mounted in support of the proposition that
the corporation should be the primary target of accountability
rather than senior corporate actors.
It is somewhat ironic, perhaps, that the very scholars who do not
highlight the separate personality of the corporation want the
corporation to be the responsible "individual". To be sure, this is
less of a contradiction than it seems at first blush because, from
these scholars' perspective, what is being made responsible are the
"funds", as it were, of an enterprise which is constituted by the
relevant contracting parties. Given their starting position, the line
of reasoning these scholars offer in support of enterprise liability is
a plausible one. The reasoning goes as follows.
If the costs of the damage-causing and/or wrongful conduct are
attributed to the enterprise, the shareholders' return will be
adversely affected. They will discipline their agents - the
directors and managers - and/or require them to set up proce-
dures and systems which will avoid these kinds of profit-
undermining and anti-social acts. All the goals which have been
set will thus be met. At the same time as social norms are being
promoted, shareholders will be safeguarded. This is so because, if
personal responsibility were attached to managerial conduct,
managers and directors would exact a price from the enterprise by
demanding extra compensation and/or contractual indemnity and
insurance to off-set their increased personal risks.
They would make such demands because, unlike the share-
holders who are able to diversify their exposure to risk, a firm-
specific investment makes managers particularly vulnerable. The
imposition of personal responsibility on directors and managers,
therefore, will lead to extra costs for the enterprise. And, if
managers and directors are not able to protect themselves
because, for example, it is difficult to get insurance coverage for
tions on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders" (1992), 45 Vand. L. Rev.
1387.
432 Canadian Business Law Journal
exposure to personal liability, they will simply become more
cautious. Their concern for their own well-being will cause them to
treat their principals' goal, profit-maximization, as a secondary
goal. The well-known agency problem, namely the possibility that
agents will exploit their position to further their own ends at the
expense of their principals, will have gained a new, and damaging,
dimension .42
By making the corporation responsible, rather than individual
corporate actors, shareholders will have an incentive to discipline
and control their agents. These agents, in turn, still will have suffi-
cient interests at stake - their professional reputation, their
career prospects and even their jobs - to ensure that they will
avoid adverse shareholder reaction. At the same time, they will
remain more willing to take profit-oriented risks than they would
if they were likely to be held directly liable, because the impact of
such personal liability is greater than the potential weight of any
subsequent shareholders' reaction to their (mis)conduct. Further,
as the costs of privately disciplining managers and directors into
acceptable social behaviour will be tailored more precisely to meet
the needs of a particular firm than any general public law rule
could ever hope to do, a more efficient form of regulation of
managers and directors should evolve.
43
This is a very neat argument. It depends, however, on certain
conditions whose existence cannot be guaranteed. First, for share-
holders to react, the potential losses imposed on them by holding
the corporation, rather than managers and the directors, respon-
sible must outweigh the potential profits from the corporate
conduct engineered by these agents. Since these shareholder-
motivating costs are fines, the fines must be optimal. 44 The diffi-
42 Not surprisingly, the availability of directors and officers' liability insurance has been the
subject of much recent scrutiny; see R. Daniels "Must Boards Go Overboard? An
Economic Analysis of the Effects of Burgeoning Statutory Liability on the Role of
Directors" in Conference on Canadian Corporate Governance, C.D. Howe Institute,
February 1994; R. Daniels and S. Hutton, "The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of
Directors' and Officers' Insurance Liability Crisis on Canadian Corporate Governance"
(1993),22C.B.L.J. 182.
43 See R. Posner, "An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law" (1985), 85 Col. L. Rev.
1193; K.G. Elzinge and W. Breit, The Anti-Trust Penalties: A Study in Law and
Economics (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1976) p. 132 et seq.; R.H.
Kraakman, "Corporation Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls" (1984),
93 Yale L.J. 857; Daniels, supra, footnote 42.
44 Parker, "Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of
Optimal Penalties" (1989), 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 513; J. Macey, "Agency Theory and
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culty of establishing this necessary condition for the enterprise
liability model to work are well-known. One source of the
problem is that there is a sentiment that a fine should be propor-
tional to the gravity of the offence. 45 This may be considerably less
than needs to be imposed if the potential profit from wrong-doing
is high and/or the likelihood of being held responsible low. The
apparent inability to develop appropriate sanctions is well-
understood as is illustrated by the recent and very earnest attempts
at devising optimal fines in the us. The purpose of these efforts
was to find ways to sanction corporations and, via their share-
holders, their corporate officers, more efficiently. 46
One of the points sought to be made in this article is illustrated
by the debates surrounding these us efforts. The arguments have
ranged from the assumption that it is obviously necessary to
increase the penalties on corporations as existing enforcement
tools and sanctions are not effective, 47 to arguments that the
response of different corporate offenders may vary at different
levels of sanctions and that some very careful calibration is
necessary when devising a scheme of optimal fines lest the exercise
becomes a self-defeating one.48 The point being made is that these
modellers of law and economics theories rely heavily on the need
to prove that cost-benefit analyses support the state's decision to
intervene with private action. Yet these kinds of assessments are
very hard to make, as is shown here when the kind of intervention
these very theorists ought to favour is subjected by them to an
exercise in empiricism.
49
the Criminal Liability of Organizations" (1991), 71 B.U.L.R. 315 at p. 317. The
assumption here is that criminal law is essentially economic in nature: conduct is criminal
because it imposes costs on others and can be deterred by making the offender internalize
the cost. Note that this approach suggests the possibility that law and economic analysis
may be distorted because it pays scant regard to other social values than cost-benefit ones
(even if sometimes lip-service is paid to the fact that they, too, deserve respect).
45 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals
(Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); R. Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing Based on
Equality and Desert (Cambridge Massachusetts, Ballinger, 1970); S. Grupp, ed.,
Theories of Punishment (Bloomington, Indiana U.P., 1971).
46 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants
(Preliminary Draft, November 1, 1989).
47 S. Saltzburg, "The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations" (1991), 71 B.U.L.R.
421.
48 For the theoretical bases of this argument, see G. Becker, "Crime and Punishment, An
Economic Approach" (1968), 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169; for an application of this theory to the
Sentencing Commission's efforts, see M. Block, "Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and
the Control of Corporate Behaviour" (1991), 71 B.U.L.R. 395.
49 The uncertainty surrounding both the theory and the "facts" is great enough to have
16-25 C.B.L.J.
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Precisely because it appears to be so difficult to sanction the
enterprise by way of monetary fines (and it must be remembered
that the shareholders are not available as targets for punishment),
those who believe in the efficacy of enterprise liability keep on
trying to devise new forms of sanctions to impose on corporations
qua corporations. 50
While none of this undermines the abstract argument that using
enterprise liability to attain social ends is the most efficient thing
to do, it does throw some serious doubt on the practical plausi-
bility of such a scheme. So also does the very real possibility of the
insolvency of an enterprise which has inflicted costs on others
and/or committed violations of legal norms. How are compen-
satory or punitive goals to be satisfied by imposing enterprise
liability in such a case? For instance, some of the largest fines
levied under the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act
have been imposed on bankrupt corporations. 51 Of course, there is
a counter-argument to the contention that the possibility of insol-
vency undermines the enterprise liability position. This is that the
imposition of personal responsibility on directors and managers
makes insolvency more likely. The idea here is that, because of
caused one eminent and committed law and economics scholar to respond to the optimal
fine movement by arguing for managerial, rather than enterprise, liability; see Macey,
supra, footnote 44.
50 Some believe in enterprise liability because, unlike contractarians, they believe in the
organic nature of a corporation, an entity separate and more than the sum of its parts.
For variants of the organic approach, see B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, "The Allocation of
Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism, and Accountability"
(1985-88), 11 Sydney L. R. 468; see also their, The Impact of Adverse Publicity on
Corporate Offenders, (Albany, SUNY Press, 1983); C. Wells, Corporations and Criminal
Responsibility (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993). For a clever attempt at finessing the
issue, see J. Coffee, Jr. "No Soul To Damn, No Body to Kick': An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment" (1981), 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386. The
development of more effective tools will support enterprise liability but, given the resis-
tance to the increase of fines simpliciter, it is unlikely that a wholesale new approach to
sanctioning of corporations is nigh. Note too that, while all this scholarly debate about
the optimal fines is going on in the United States, the direct representatives of corporate
interests have been fighting a mighty battle to avoid the imposition of more serious fines
on corporations. That is, they are resisting something which the classical economic
proponents of efficiency tell them might be to their overall advantage. See, eg., Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
51 For example, Elan Corporation, when bankrupt, was fined $400,000, at that time the
largest fine imposed; see Windsor Star, February 13, 1992, p. A3. Now a larger fine,
$475,000 has been levied against Noranda Mines Inc. for failure to obtain a permit for an
elevator, for failure to examine a blasting area properly and for failing to meet safety
standards in an underground mine. A worker had been killed. At the time of writing, this
fine is under appeal.
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their increased risk, managers and directors will not take the risks
they otherwise might incur on behalf of the corporation and this
may affect its viability in some circumstances. 52 This is theoreti-
cally plausible, but empirically difficult to support. For instance,
such questions arise as: what lawful risks would not be taken as a
result of the imposition of personal responsibility and, if one could
think of such risks, would there be different impacts from this kind
of risk-avoidance in different kinds of firms? These sorts of
questions cannot be answered in the abstract. Again, then, this
creates a dilemma for the proponents of enterprise liability who
prefer that model of responsibility because, empirically, it is
bound to be more efficient than one which imposes personal
liability on corporate actors.
Similar empirical difficulties for the model arise because a
corporation may be under-capitalized. The law requires no
minimum level of capitalization and investors may not have had
the wherewithal, or have seen the need, to fund the enterprise so
as to enable it to meet certain costs or penalties. Or, even if the
risks can be anticipated, they may have led the investors to hive-
off the risky operations by having them carried out in a separate
corporate vehicle; that is, they will have shielded themselves from
responsibility by using the flexibility of the separate legal person. 53
However it arises, under-capitalization may well make the enter-
prise liability model unworkable in a number of cases. 54
Expecting shareholders, whose enterprise has been held
responsible, to discipline their directors and managers may be
based on shaky grounds for a variety of other reasons as well.
In a widely held corporation one of the raisons d'6tre of the logic
of limited liability, namely that investors' risks are diversified
because what they lose in one investment may be off-set by a gain
elsewhere, suggests that it may sometimes be difficult to motivate
shareholders to act against delinquent agents. 55 As noted, the size
52 See, Daniels, supra footnote 42.
53 See Mark J. Roe, "Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort" (1986), 72 Va. L. Rev. 1.
54 Proponents of the model sometimes argue for changes to the rules of capitalization. It is
said that these are difficult to design and even more difficult to implement; Daniels,
supra, footnote 42; Ziegel, supra, footnote 4; see also the discussion of the difficulty by
the Jenkins Committee (1962) Cmnd. 1794, para. 55 et seq., which would have liked to
recommend a minimum capital requirement, but did not.
55 There is very little in corporate law, as opposed to the supposed push of market forces
posited by law and economics scholars, which requires the imposition of internal disci-
pline by shareholders; see J. Coffee, "Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-
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of the enterprise's liability affects the plausibility of the argument,
as huge costs or fines may affect otherwise passive shareholders. It
is, therefore, uncertain whether shareholders will exert appro-
priate discipline over directors and managers. In addition, share-
holders might take the view that to discipline their managers for
having caused corporate liability would be unduly upsetting to the
corporation's operations which already have been disturbed by
the imposition of liability on the enterprise. Equally, they may
fear that to identify wrongdoing and wrongdoers will only
encourage people who may want to bring civil actions against the
corporation, and/or shareholders may believe that to take action
against senior corporate managers and directors will encourage
whistle-blowers within the corporation.
56
All of these potential problems with the arguments for an
emphasis on enterprise liability rather than on personal
responsibility57 draw our attention back to one of the starting
points of the argument in this article, namely that something is lost
when a corporation is held responsible, especially if that responsi-
bility is criminal in nature. Lederman has argued that the
"cohesive link within criminal law, between the commanding
authority and the conscious individual who alone is susceptible to
guidance is threatened when confronted with the imputation of
criminal liability to corporations, which by their very nature lack
any consciousness". 58 While the argument that the criminal law is
Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions" (1980), 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
419; C. Shearing and P. Stenning, eds., Private Policing (Newbury Park, California, Sage
Publications, 1987); A.M. Honor6, "Groups, Laws, and Obedience" in A.W.B.
Simpson, ed. Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 2nd Series (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1973).
56 See Fisse and Braithwaite, supra, footnote 50; J. Coffee, Jr., "Corporate Criminal
Responsibility" in S. Kadish, ed., Encyclopaedia of Crime and Justice (New York, Free
Press, 1983).
57 This article is concerned with the wisdom and effects of the imposition of liabilities on
directors rather than managers. Many of the law and economic scholars' arguments apply
both to directors and managers, but some clearly do not. For instance, since the logic of
creating increased risk-adverseness rests on the firm specific investment of a manager,
this does not apply with equal force to a director, certainly not to an outside director.
Inasmuch as the effectiveness of enterprise liability rests on the manager's fear for his/her
job security, this has no application to the director situation, although the threat to
reputation does. It may be the case that the pro-enterprise liability arguments are over-
inclusive if they are thought to be applicable to directors without more.
58 See, E. Lederman "Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Re-thinking a Complex
Triangle" (1985), 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 285 at p. 296; see also D. Cressey, "The
Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research" (1988), 1 Adv. Theor. Crim. 31.
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not a meaningful tool when applied to corporations is fiercely
disputed by scholars interested in organizational theory, 59 the
argument has resonance with law-makers and regulators. In view
of this, and the many questions about the ability of enterprise
liability to regulate the behaviour of corporate actors in a way
which achieves the purposes of law-makers and regulators, it is not
surprising that they have been looking for other ways to ensure
more responsible conduct by corporations. Indeed, the reasons to
make direct personal responsibility more of a tool than it has been
heretofore are manifold and pervasive.
III. IMPETUS FOR MAKING DIRECTORS PERSONALLY
RESPONSIBLE
By way of reprise, let us note that a search is on to make
someone (or something) responsible for corporate conduct
because the doctrines of legal personality and limited liability put
the most obvious persons, the shareholders, out of reach. Appar-
ently, this starting point is not to be questioned in any serious
way. 60 This creates particular problems where the enterprise is a
closely held corporation. In those cases, the twin characteristics,
separate legal personality and limited liability, combined with the
possible insolvency and/or under-capitalization of the firm, are
likely to leave involuntary creditors and state institutions holding
an empty bag.
61
59 See, eg., Fisse and Braithwaite and Wells supra, footnote 50. The argument of these
scholars is that the corporation is an organic entity, that it is more than the sum of its
individual components. Thus, the goals of stigmatization and deterrence may be
achieved by punishing a corporation in an appropriate way. For a partial response see H.
J. Glasbeek, "The Corporational Responsibility Movement - The Latest in Maginot
Lines to Save Capitalism" (1988), 11 Dalh. L.J. 363; "Why Corporate Deviance is not
Treated as Crime-The Need to Make 'Profits' a Dirty Word" (1984), 22 O.H.L.J. 393.
What is important to note here is that the organizational behaviour approach conflicts
with the contractual conceptualization of the corporation and should not be looked to for
support by contractarians.
60 Here very influential vested interests, the long and successful history of limited liability
as part and parcel of welfare creation and the logic of law and economics-type thinking
come together to make the questioning of limited liability very difficult. For an argument
that shareholders, as well as senior officers and directors, should be held criminally
responsible for corporate deviance, see H.J. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance. .. ",
ibid. I still believe this to be a legally plausible argument, but one which has little
resonance with policy-makers because of the very influential forces ranged against it.
61 The hallmark of all of this is the old case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] A.C.
22 (H.L.); the literature and the case law is well-known. It is intriguing, however, that the
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It is in this context that some law and economics scholars
acknowledge that the abolition of limited liability may make
sense. 62 But, so far, this is merely talk in books; there is no action.
This is so because, rather than take on the project of abolishing
limited liability for some corporate vehicles - a difficult task
which may have unexpected or undesirable repercussions for the
legitimacy and/or use of the corporate form generally - legisla-
tures and regulators are more comfortable when targeting
directors and managers in order to attain their objectives. Possibly
they are encouraged to take this route because targeting directors
does not require them to engage in an analytical departure from
well-established practices. This may be comforting because they
will not be seen to be attacking directly the always hard-to-
maintain legitimacy of the corporate vehicle at a time when this
legitimacy is feeling some other pressures.
In particular, legislators want to avoid being seen as questioning
the legitimacy of the corporate vehicle, which is so central to the
market mechanism, because recently that market system has not
been delivering as much welfare as it did during the 25 or 30 years
following the post-war period. Governments get their status and
prestige from the fact that welfare is being created by the private
sector. In liberal democratic capitalist states such as our own,
governments are required to create optimal conditions for welfare
creation by capitalists and, at the same time, they will get kudos
for being seen to be willing to mediate the worst effects of an
economic system which, if left alone, might have egregious
impacts on some of the citizenry. They must appear both to
support corporate actors and to be regulating them. This tension-
filled role is a particularly difficult one to discharge at the moment.
This is not the place for an exegesis on contemporary political
economic developments. It is clear, however, that large wealth
owners, claiming to be under market-generated competitive
pressures, are urging governments to give them more help by
deregulating the economic system, tearing down barriers to trade,
problem keeps cropping up in new guises, telling us something about the manipulability
of the concepts of legal personality and limited liability and about their hardiness; see,
550551 Ontario Ltd. v. Framingham (1991), 91 C.L.L.C. 14,031 (Ont. Ct. of Justice);
H.J. Glasbeek and E. Tucker, "Death by Consensus; The Westray Story", Monograph,
York University: Centre for Research on Work and Society, 1992; also published in New
Solutions, Summer 1993, p. 14.
62 Supra, text at footnote 13.
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etc. Governments seem to accept the logic of these arguments but
feel the need to reassure their citizens that this does not mean that
they will lose any of the protections they had won over time
against the more harmful externalities and outcomes of unregu-
lated competition.
In a context where there is a good deal of belief that the
corporate sector is guilty of much deviance 63 or seems to care little
for community needs,64 and at a time when members of the corpo-
rations themselves have been calling for more accountability by
directors and managers, 65 governments feel the need to demon-
strate that the corporate sector still can be trusted to be the engine
of welfare creation because, in large part, its excesses are being
kept under control by governments. The targeting of directors is a
useful tool for policy-makers as they subtly, instinctively
manoeuvre to maintain public trust in the status quo.
IV. THE INCREASE IN NUMBER AND IN KINDS OF DIRECTOR
RESPONSIBILITIES
Jacob Ziegel has noted that the enumeration of emerging
director responsibilities has become something of a growth
industry. The newsletters and trade journals to which he refers
describe both the nature of these responsibilities and what
directors need to do to meet their obligations and to diminish their
personal liability. 66 It is, therefore, not very useful to set out
another list of the potential legal issues with which directors have
to deal. It is sufficient for the purposes of this discussion to give a
63 For a discussion, see Glasbeek, "The Corporate Social Responsibility ... " supra,
footnote 59; L. Snider, Bad Business; Corporate Crime in Canada (Scarborough, Nelson
Canada, 1993); D. Ellis, The Wrong Stuff: An Introduction to the Sociological Study of
Deviance (Toronto, Collier MacMillan, 1987).
64 This is in part the origin of the argument that the managers should use their discretion to
take the interests of other groups than shareholders into account, the so-called social
responsibility movement - based on the anti-managerialist views which were very
popular in the 1960s - but which were met with vehement responses from
contractarians.
65 Those range from demands for control over directors' behaviour in takeovers and
mergers to the need to control executive compensation and self-dealing as well as to the
need to prevent a repetition of some spectacular frauds and insider-trading activities -
e.g., Milken, Boesky - and unexpected large failures of respectable corporations
(savings and loans banks in the United States, Canadian Commercial Bank and Confed-
eration Life are some high profile examples).
66 J. Ziegel, "Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution - An Anglo-
Canadian Perspective" (1993), 43 U.T.L.J. 511 at p. 525.
440 Canadian Business Law Journal
sense of the vast variety of circumstances in which directors have
enforceable duties and obligations to persons other than the
corporation and its members.
Directors are personally responsible for setting moneys aside
for revenue collecting authorities. There is a vast range of such
provisions, from income tax Acts, to retail tax Acts and goods and
services revenue-raising statutes. In the same way, directors are
responsible for making sure that premiums are payable to such
schemes as the Canada Pension Plan, the Unemployment
Insurance Commission, as well as for a variety of obligations
under environmental statutory schemes, occupational health and
safety regimes, and responsibilities under employment standards
Acts and the Competition Act. Further, directors can be made
personally responsible for wages owed to employees upon the
insolvency of a corporation. Here it is to be noted that the
corporate statutes have been supplemented by employment
standards legislation. 67
The increased variety of things for which directors can be held
responsible is a remarkable addition to the rather few and simple
requirements imposed on boards of directors by the business
corporations statutes. Under such statutes they are required to act
in good faith and to exercise their best judgment (at an unspecified
but relatively low level of care, skill and diligence) in the interest
of the corporation, writ large. As if this were not enough, an
obligation to safeguard some voluntary creditors' interests is
emerging as a legal obligation as a result of judicial decisions in
some jurisdictions and legislative policy in others.
When courts hold directors responsible to creditors it is not
always clear whether they are doing so because the directors,
knowing that their corporation was in peril, did not act with
proper regard to the corporation's interests when they disregarded
the interests of the corporation's creditors, or whether it is because
such directors failed in their obligations to creditors, tout court.
These issues have been extensively canvassed in both the cases and
in the literature. 68 For our purposes, what is important is that
directors are being attributed very serious legal responsibilities by
6 7 See, e.g., Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.14, Part XIV.1, which
guarantees that employees get something fairly quickly, independent of the directors'
responsibility.
68 See Ziegel, supra, footnote 66; L. Sealy, "Directors' 'Wider' Responsibilities -
Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural" (1987), 13 Monash U.L. Rev. 164.
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some courts and legislatures. And, in Canada, the judicial
readiness to make the statutory remedy of oppression available to
voluntary creditors means that directors, who may be asked to
bear the brunt of remedial orders, also are confronted by legal
responsibilities which impose a burden on them to look to
creditors' interests when exercising their powers on behalf of the
corporation. 6
9
This is quite a menu of responsibilities. While, as argued in Part
II(1) of this article, the increasing range of director liabilities does
not, in and of itself, present a conceptual problem, a question does
arise as to when this increase in the quantum of obligations to the
outside world will make the legal model of corporate governance a
caricature of the way in which the corporation functions in the real
world. That is, there could be a point at which the concerns of
those who have adopted the legal model approach to corporate
theory and the concerns of contractarians may very well overlap.
The latter theorists, of course, are alarmed by the dramatic
increase in direct director responsibilities. They have a deep belief
that this will lead to a risk-averseness which may hamper the
efficiency potential of the corporate vehicle, perhaps to the point
of catatonia.
Their anxiety probably has been heightened by some as yet
unmentioned aspects of the statutory responsibilities which have
been imposed on directors. First, most of the obligations seem to
arise under what are generally known as welfare offence schemes.
This means that, inasmuch as penalties are sought to be imposed
on directors, the government's burden of proof may be reduced to
that associated with strict liability offences rather than with the
pure mens rea requirement associated with criminal offences. The
directors have the burden of establishing that they exercised due
diligence to try to prevent the offending conduct. This gives the
creation of statutory director liability a sharper bite, adding to the
directors' (and their legal theoretical allies') worries about these
developments. 70 Still, it is acknowledged that the availability of
69 See Ziegel, supra, footnote 66, for a fine discussion of the expansion of the oppression
remedy and the rather peculiar way in which directors have become responsible to
creditors and in which creditors have got standing.
70 The categorization of offences into absolute, strict liability and criminal offenses received
judicial approval in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City) (1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161, [1978] 2
S.C.R. 1299, analytically difficult though it may be to justify. The constitutionality of
changing the burden of proof from mens rea to due diligence was also approved of by the
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the due diligence defence to directors on whom responsibilities
have been imposed is better than the application of absolute
liability rules.71
Second, some of the more recent statutory impositions of
responsibility on directors are different in kind from their
predecessors. 72 The older statutes73 imposed responsibilities on
directors for wrongful or harm-causing conduct by the corpo-
ration. Typically, s. 242 of the Income Tax Act provides that,
where a corporation is guilty of an offence under that legislation,
an officer, director or agent of the corporation who directed,
authorized, assented to, acquiesced in, or participated in the
commission of the offence is a party to and guilty of the offence
and is liable to be convicted and sanctioned. 74 This kind of
provision means that the director is being held responsible
because the corporation has committed a wrong in which the
director has played a part. To bring this into line with the
argument made earlier, these kinds of provisions hold the director
responsible because s/he is viewed as having made a corporate act
her own. This is not how the director's responsibility is seen under
some of the more recent statutes, such as the Ontario Environ-
mental Protection Act.75
Section 194 provides that:
Every director or officer of a corporation that engages in an activity that may
result in the discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment
contrary to this Act or the regulations has a duty to take all reasonable care
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Wholesale Travel Inc. (1991), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 161,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 154. For a concern that the due diligence offence may not be sufficient to
protect directors, see Daniels, supra, footnote 42, who argues that there is a danger that
the courts may wrongfully assume that directors are well enough protected by insurance
and other indemnities and, therefore, will make it very difficult for them to establish due
diligence in the courts' zeal to make sure that someone "pays".
71 As we shall see, the Draft Report of the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on
Corporate Governance in Canada, "Where Were the Directors?", May 1994, argues for
the inclusion of a due diligence defence if the trend towards making directors ever more
responsible for harm arising out of conduct to further the corporations' best interests
continues.
72 For a very useful discussion, see Andrew J. Roman, "Personal Liability of Directors and
Officers of Corporations for Violation of Environmental Norms" (1993), 12 Nat. Bank.
L. Rev. 20.
73 The proponents of enterprise liability believe that such statutes are dangerous enough.
74 This is in addition to the fact that there will be responsibility for remitting the moneys
owed to Revenue Canada, Income Tax Act, s. 227; see also Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-
71-72, c. 63. There are many similar provisions on the books.
75 R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19.
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to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting such unlawful
discharge.
It goes on to say that a director is liable to conviction whether or
not the corporation has been prosecuted or convicted. There is no
requirement that the corporation itself have engaged in violating
conduct. The director's responsibility arises independently of the
existence of a corporate duty. The director's duty is direct. It
requires her/him to take care lest the harm which the corporation
might cause materializes; the harm need not actually occur. While
it is most unlikely that, even under these differently structured
provisions, the director will be made responsible when the corpo-
ration has not inflicted harm, these provisions do present an
important change in emphasis. 76
Under the director responsibility for the corporation's breach of
duty provisions, directors will only be liable if there was a
corporate violation and if in some way they have acquiesced or
permitted or actually positively encouraged the conduct. Given
the jurisprudence which does not require a director to be particu-
larly skilled or knowledgeable, and the deference given by courts
to the directors' delegation of daily operations to competent
managers, a hands-off director can easily meet many of the
responsibilities imposed by these kinds of provisions. It is true that
there may be a chain reaction if the delegatees/officers are held
personally responsible for their positive participation in a
corporate violation. This will cause them to want to be relieved of
responsibility when they carry out the wishes of the directors.
They will work towards the establishment of procedures and
systems which will involve directors in decision-making and,
therefore, make them potentially liable for the implementation of
these decisions by their delegatees. The extent to which this will
happen will depend on the frequency of successful enforcement
against the enterprise and its officers.
There is no such uncertainty about the effect of the statutory
provisions which impose responsibilities on directors independent
of corporate wrongdoing. The need to set up adequate monitoring
is plain; the pressure on directors to become more like hands-on
functionaries is great. How much of a challenge to the traditional
76 There are a whole range of these kinds of provisions: see Environmental Protection Act,
R.S.O. 1990 c. E. 19; Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11; Ontario Water Resources
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.40; Occupational Health & Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.1.
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nature of corporate governance this represents remains to be seen.
In any event, both types of provisions are bound to have some
effect on corporate governance structures.
IV. POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
While there are many new duties, directors still are not being
asked to weigh profit maximization against other social interests
and values. Rather, they are being asked to maximize profits in a
market place which has been democratically circumscribed by the
state. Corporations, like any other kind of business, always have
been limited in this way. Clearly, what is happening is that
regulators, perhaps motivated by the fear of their loss of
reputation and legitimacy because there appears to be too much
unchecked deviant behaviour by corporate actors, are looking for
cheaper and more effective ways to make corporations play within
the rules. As seen, the apparent lack of control over corporate
behaviour has been a major launching pad of the corporate social
responsibility movement.
The debate around the design of appropriate penalties has been
inspired, in large part, by the perception that large corporate
actors flagrantly breach the law because it pays them to do so. To
respond to this problem, suggestions have included proposals for
increased fines, different kinds of sanctions and the imposition of
new duties on directors or the establishment of specialized
directors. This is not the same agenda for reform, however, as the
one which would turn corporate actors into arbitrators of what a
just and equitable society needs and deserves. This was the
thought behind the advocacy of some of the anti-managerialists'
arguments and which it underpins the reasoning of some of the
more contemporary corporate social responsibility proponents.
The core of their argument is that, because corporations control so
much of the wealth, some managers of large corporations have
true, sometimes determinative, economic and social policy-
making power over the citizenry; they should take that citizenry
interest into account, beyond what the law requires them to do,
when making decisions. 77
77 The literature is voluminous and well-known. To cite one of the best-known examples,
see C. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (New
York, Harper & Law, 1975).
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To force directors to comply with the law by making them
personally responsible represents a much more modest agenda,
one which cannot be objected to on the basis that privately
appointed persons are being asked to make legislative choices.
7 8
The only riposte which can be made to this more modest agenda is
the one which is made by law and economics theorists, namely
that, whatever regulators believe, this kind of enforcement
mechanism is likely to lead to less efficiency than continued
reliance on (improved) enterprise liability. Earlier I argued that,
in the abstract, the foundations of this kind of response are, at
best, equivocal. We are now in a position to look at some more
concrete political and economic problems with this line of
argument.
First, the assumption must be that governments believe that
reliance on enterprise liability is not working as well as it should
be. This may be because the corporate sector and its allies have
been very influential in inhibiting regulators and legislators from
imposing appropriate sanctions and setting appropriate standards.
From this perspective, an argument based on the fact that, after
all, enterprise liability could be perfected, is likely to be viewed
with suspicion by regulators and policy-makers. Since one of the
concrete influences on regulators and policy-makers is to enhance
the legitimacy of government, this scepticism is a serious consider-
ation militating against reliance by policy-makers on enterprise
liability rather than personal liability.
Second, one of the social/political values which is thought to
imbue the law - that individuals should be responsible for their
actions - can be better attained by imposing personal responsi-
bility on directors. They are particularly attractive targets to legis-
lators because, under the statutory model of the corporation,
directors are the governors of the corporation. That is, the goal of
promoting the overall efficiency and acceptability of the legal
system is seen as being furthered by making directors directly
78 Classical economists and the law and economics theorists have availed themselves of two
powerful responses to the social responsibility movement: the first is that there is no way
to tell what other interests, in addition to profit-maximization, should be taken into
account, whereas the second is that, if unelected managers are to make social and legis-
lative decisions, they soon will be replaced by state appointed officials. The classic texts
are M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago, Univ. of Chic. Press, 1962) and F.
Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982) also
see Glasbeek, supra, footnote 59 and the literature discussed there.
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responsible. The impact of this consideration is difficult to put in
the scales of cost-benefit analyses of efficient welfare-creation of
the economic kind. Nevertheless, it should be accorded some
weight, indeed perhaps a great deal of weight, because of the
significance of the legitimacy of the legal system to the political
regime which, in turn, supports the economic model.
Third, one of the arguments which supports the case for the
superiority of enterprise liability over personal liability hinges on
the fact that it is easier, in evidentiary terms, to attribute responsi-
bility to enterprises than it is to individuals. 79 The reasoning is that
it is difficult in a complex organizational structure to find the
decision-makers. Consequently, the increased enforcement costs
make the imposition of personal responsibility less efficient than
enterprise liability. While this argument has some credibility,
maybe it should have less than is usually accorded it. It is valid
enough when the director's statutory responsibility requires
proving both corporate wrongdoing and the director's partici-
pation in it, but it does not apply to the responsibility imposed on
directors when they are given a discrete, personal statutory duty to
carry out. In those cases, at least, the efficiency argument for non-
liability loses much of its force.
Fourth, it is probably accurate to assert that the source of much
of the embarrassment is the manipulation of the corporate vehicle
by shareholders of smaller, closely held corporations. Making
directors, who often also are the major shareholders and opera-
tional managers of such corporations, personally responsible will
help attain objectives which are much harder to realize if reliance
needs to be placed on poorly premised piercing of the corporate
veil techniques and/or on investing scarce political capital into
(likely ill-fated) efforts to demand minimum capitalization for
smaller firms. As argued earlier, it is hard for the contractarians,
who are more interested in the way in which the corporation
actually functions than in the niceties of the sterile legal model of
the corporation, to oppose this way of dealing with problems
which arise from, and which are not easily soluble within, the
statutory model of the corporation.
79 See, for instance R. Kraakman, "Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Contracts" (1984), 93 Yale L.J. 857. Kraakman argues that, among other reasons, this is
why enterprise liability has become the norm rather than the intuitively more appealing
personal liability.
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There are, then, solid political and economic bases on which the
proponents of the imposition of personal responsibility on
directors can argue that they have amply discharged any burden
the law and economics scholars want to put on them in the name of
efficiency. 80 Indeed, the law and economics' case against director
responsibility has to be fortified by moving from abstract and non-
empirical economic-type arguments of efficiency and risk-
averseness to more concrete contentions that the imposition of
such burdens is bound to be inefficient because: (i) in a minority
of, but nonetheless very important, cases, it will become very
difficult for corporations to attract the right kind of directors;81
and (ii) this would be a bad thing or, in the contractarians'
language, it would lead to inefficiency. Here I note that it is largely
the status of the directors, as well as the nature of their corpora-
tions (their size and their widely held nature), that gave rise to the
hue and cry which surrounded the Bata and PWA subsidiaries and
Westar cases. Again, however, this spin on the efficiency
argument, like other arguments meant to bolster the law and
economics' case, raises some intriguing questions.
First, the imposition of both criminal and civil liabilities on
directors is not new. And, despite the increase in their liabilities, it
has not resulted in a shortage of candidates for directorial
appointment. To make the point in a small way, some well-in-
formed people, with a great deal of worldly experience, whose
reputation (as well as personal fortunes) ought to mean something
to them, seem to be falling over themselves to sit on supposedly
perilous boards of directors. 82 As is common in this debate, the
80 Here it is worth remembering that that burden should be lighter in respect of directors
than it is in respect of managers and officers; supra, footnote 57.
81 The TSE Draft Report, supra, footnote 71, provides some anecdotal support. The
Molson Companies Ltd. spokespeople are quoted, at p. 33, as saying: "Over the long
term, this (imposition of directors' liability) will inevitably lead to the diminution of
qualified business advice and counsel, thereby reducing Boards to legal fora which
observe the letter rather than the spirit of the law". The representatives of C.R. Spector,
Byers Casgrain, are quoted, at p. 34, as follows: "While recognizing the policy concerns
... it is clear that some balance must be struck in order to enable companies to attract
competent independent directors...".
82 Former Progressive Conservative Finance Minister, Michael Wilson, joined the bank of
directors at Amoco Corp; he was to be paid at least us$44,000 in cash and stock for
meetings which are held once a month (Toronto Star, November 2, 1993); former Prime
Minister Mulroney became a director of American Barrick Resources Corp., at $12,000
per year plus $600 per meeting, plus some very generous stock options (Toronto Star,
November 9, 1993); Mila Mulroney was appointed to the board of Astral Communi-
cation Inc. (Toronto Star, December 30, 1993); former Progressive Conservative cabinet
448 Canadian Business Law Journal
theoretical argument offered by contractarians is appealing but its
empirical basis is not well-established. 8
3
Second, one of the consequences, indeed goals, of imposing
personal responsibility on directors is to ensure that they will set
up monitoring systems in respect of the legal obligations which
they have to meet. While it is easier for directors to establish the
defences available to them under the statutes which require a
corporation to be found liable first than it is under the more recent
crop of independent directors' duty-type provisions, directors
under both sets of statutes may discharge their responsibilities by
setting up a preventive system in respect of all the identified legal
objectives which must be met. To do this the directors must cause
a precautionary system to be established, appoint appropriate
managers and officers to operationalize it, and they must insist on
getting regular reports that advise them about both compliance
and non-compliance from the relevant managers and officers.
It is clear that extra costs will be incurred by the enterprise as a
result of these monitoring/defence systems; however, it is also
clear that, assuming that social welfare, as defined by the elected
government, requires compliance, there will be social benefits,
including the enhanced legitimacy of private wealth-creation.
No less important, it seems that well-advised directors will be
able to shield themselves from many of the legal responsibilities
about which so much fuss is being made. It is true that this will not
minister Don Mazankowski was appointed to the board of Gulf Canada Resources
Limited (Globe & Mail, January 5, 1994). See, generally, "The 'super elite' can often
find new work" (Toronto Star, August 23, 1993). Politicians are not the only ones
pleased to accept such appointments. Many CEO's hold many directorships presumably
out of a sense of noblesse oblige (which might make them ready to give up their posts if
the risks increase) and from a sense that it helps them look after their own corporate
interests (which might induce them to accept some extra risks). For a dramatic, if
somewhat unusual example, note that when Mr. Trevor Eyton was appointed to the
Senate, he acknowledged that he might have to give up one or more of the 26 director-
ships he held (Toronto Star, September 30,1990, p. F1).
83 The TSE Draft Report, supra, footnote 71, at p. 35, refers to a report of a Federal
Government Interdepartmental Working Group from which it quotes:
Statutory liability faced by directors has expanded during the last twenty years
particularly with respect to source deductions, taxes, unpaid wages, severance and
termination pay, and environmental and corporate law. .. increased exposure of
directors' liability ... .This has raised concerns in the business community. ...
Despite these concerns, the Working Group did not find sufficient evidence to
conclude that directors' liability has become so severe that it could not be handled
by the market. .. The Working Group did not find sufficient evidence to conclude
that directors are resigning in significant numbers to avoid the liabilities that they
face.
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always be possible: some of the responsibilities are for debts owed
by the corporation (to employees, to some creditors) if it becomes
insolvent, or as a result of conduct in a near-insolvency situation
(the PWA and Westar cases). This may have a chilling effect on
would-be directors, but if the concern can be narrowed down to
those cases, the fear that there will be a lack of directors may be
reduced. To put the many and varying legal liabilities of directors
together in one pot and raise the alarm as if there were no
difference between them does not serve analysis or public policy-
makers well.
Third, while it is claimed that the burdens directors face because
of the greater enforceability of the responsibilities they owe to the
outside world may frighten them off, this is not the approach taken
when different kinds of stakeholders need protection. Thus, some
of the same pressures and arguments, which, I have suggested, are
leading to a greater willingness on the part of regulators and legis-
lators to impose personal responsibility on directors, have pushed
some people to argue for a change to corporate governance which
will require more work and more care by those very same directors
the efficiency theorists seek to protect in the other circumstance.
In recent times, there has been an increased concern that
directors have not monitored management well enough and that,
as a result, shareholders' interests have not been adequately
protected. The perceived harms are large scale failures, as well as
allegedly unnecessary defensive tactics during takeovers,
undeservedly high compensation of executives, in addition to
concerns about conflicts of interest and incompetence. 84 That is,
shareholders are seen as being burdened with unacceptable
agency costs and losses due to the lack of efficient controls over
their agents. A corporate governance system which permits the
84 Whether these perceptions reflect actuality does not matter as much as the fact that they
are widely shared. For instance, TSE Draft Report, supra, footnote 71, paras. 1.4 to 1.5
states:
While there are numerous Canadian public companies which are well-governed
and provide a high standard of corporate governance, we believe there have been
several instances of corporate breakdown attributable in part to an ineffective
governane ... Had these corporations been more effectively governed we believe
the risk of these failures and the magnitude of losses occurred would have been
significantly reduced... Shareholders and other investors have experienced cause
for concern regarding the general efficacy of the governance of our corporations...
We have observed that these events have contributed to a scepticism in many
quarters about corporate governance in Canada.
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investors, the owners, to be so disadvantaged had to come under
scrutiny.
It should be relatively easy to solve this problem by applying the
remedies suggested by proponents of enterprise liability.
Presumably, if shareholders become aware that the people they
have appointed to look after their interests have become lap dogs
for shirking and looting managers and officers, and/or that
directors are willing to favour their own interests over those of
their principals, and/or that directors are incompetent, they could
set up the appropriate monitoring and sanctioning systems. More
precise contractual obligations, buttressed by existing statutory
remedies, and a publicized refusal to hire people whose reputation
has been degraded because of their past transgressions and
failures, etc., should prevent directors from falling down on the
job.
Unsurprisingly, this is how many of these scholars would like to
respond to this kind of corporate governance problem. They
would prefer not to impose legislative corporate governance rules
which restrict directors' activities. Given that (in the USA at least)
the widely held shareholding which characterizes large corpora-
tions makes it unattractive and difficult for shareholders to assert
their interest, many analysts are putting their faith in large institu-
tional investors. They hope that they can be induced to change
their traditional pattern, that is, from being passive, management-
oriented shareholders to becoming active, management-
monitoring shareholders. Whatever the potential of this
approach, 85 there are many who doubt that we ought to wait and
see.
It is against this background that the TSE-commissioned study86
made its recommendations. The report urged the same kind of
corporate governance structure (directors appointed with the
specific obligation to ensure that profit-maximization and legal
requirement systems be set up, that the appointment of appro-
priate managers/officers/auditors, etc., who are to report back to
those directors on a regular basis, become an enforceable duty,
85 The potential may be greater in the us than in Canada. For an argument that institutional
investors can provide an antidote for the problem, see J. Coffee, Jr., "Liquidity versus
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor" (1991), 91 Yale L.J. 1277. For
an argument that institutional investors may not be that much help, see H. Gartner,
"Institutional Investors and the New Financial Order" (1992), 44 Rutgers L.R. 585.
86 Supra, footnote 71.
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etc.) which the statutorily imposed special duties on directors are
going to cause to evolve as directors set up due diligence systems
to protect themselves.8 7 For the purposes of this article, a number
of points emerge.
Although the directors' liability in case of failure may not lead
to sanctions as dramatic as those imposed under the existing
statutes, it is clear that the TSE Report's suggested scheme of
corporate governance would impose some enforceable responsi-
bilities and liabilities on directors. What this means is that, from
the perspective of looking after the shareholders' interests, the TSE
Report supports the argument for the imposition of new legal and
operational responsibilities on directors. Apparently, to the TSE
Task Force the perceived need for more competence and account-
ability outweighs any concern there might be that the market for
competent directors will dry up.
In addition to the other arguments made in this section, this
suggests that the contention that there will be a dearth of people
willing to serve on boards of directors if we do not make enterprise
liability the linch-pin of the system is not all that convincing.
Moreover, given the fact that as sober a status quo-favouring body
as the TSE Task Force supports the imposition of new legal respon-
sibilities on directors provided this helps promote the internal
vigilance and diligence of directors, the question is raised whether
the opposition to a change from enterprise liability is as much
about welfare/efficiency as it is about preserving the interests of
existing corporations and their owners. The very raising of this
question gives birth to others of a (necessarily) speculative nature.
V. THE ISSUE OF CLASS
Law and economics scholars argue for efficiency within the
market as it is constructed at any one time. Thus, when faced with
contentions that there should be different allocations and results
to those which are produced by efficient profit-maximizing activ-
ities, their response must be that, if different outcomes are desired
than those a properly working market is delivering, elected
governments should regulate to achieve this; that is, governments
should change the allocation and permitted uses of resources.
87 In addition, the TSE Draft Report stresses the need to find a greater number of
competent, independent ("unrelated") directors.
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After legislators have done this, they should let the system of self-
advancement operate freely again.
The argument is that the paradigm is a value free one: efficiency
is to be promoted within any one specific context on which there
has been some democratically arranged consensus. But, despite
the claim that the theory is value free, it may well be the case that
its proponents ideologically prefer a system of allocation where
the existing division of wealth (which, in Canada, is very unequal)
is as little disturbed as possible. Of course, this is an undocu-
mentable assertion, but one which, intuitively, strikes a
responsive chord. Even if it is just plausibly true, it is worth
revisiting some of the law and economics proponents' arguments
from this vantage point.
In particular, the corporate social responsibility movement
argues that directors and managers of corporations should not
only obey the law - that is, maximize profits within the existing
market structure - but should refrain from maximizing those
profits to defer to other, non-legislated-for social interests and
values. However, this reasoning is met with the more persuasive
counter-argument that this is bound to lead to the inefficient
allocation of resources (because profit-maximization is a specific,
unambiguous goal, whereas the balancing of an unspecified
number of different kinds of interests is not) and that to require
such legislative-type calibration by privately appointed directors
and managers would lead to undemocratic results. 88 These
arguments have no force when what directors/managers are asked
to do is to restrict profit-maximizing efforts to what is permitted by
democratically passed legislation.
Law and economics theorists who oppose this kind of direct
restriction, then, seem to have put themselves on shaky ground.
This suggests the possibility that these very sophisticated scholars
just may not like the fact that the legislative constraints on
resource uses are being made much more effective than they were.
After all, there is always a tension for both the classical economist
and for the law and economics' analyst: the more regulation of
resources and their uses there is, the less interesting and useful it
becomes to play the game of efficient profit-maximization.
Of course, it is somewhat presumptuous to attribute a state of
mind to scholars and activists of which, even if it does affect their
88 Supra, footnote 78.
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thinking, they may well be totally unaware. Still, there is some
supporting evidence to be found in the TSE Draft proposals. 89 The
authors recommended the creation of a structure of corporate
governance which will demand much more diligence on the part of
directors than traditionally has been demanded of them by
business corporations statutes. As such, they were not in a good
position to argue that the imposition of personal responsibility on
directors for corporate compliance with legislated norms should
be rejected out of hand. They urged, therefore, that, if govern-
ments continue to insist on imposing such responsibilities, they
should afford directors a defence of due diligence and, most
importantly, they should think very carefully about the nature and
the number of the responsibilities they impose. They recom-
mended that governments engage in some kind of cost-benefit
analysis to make sure that the social and political goals pursued
would not come at the expense of economic welfare-production
through the vehicle of the corporation. That is, while there is no
pronouncement in the report as to what might be an acceptable
level of intervention with the existing market, it is clearly stated
that existing and future interventions ought to be viewed with
some scepticism. This contrasts nicely with their willingness to
impose new responsibilities on directors to protect shareholders.
I conjecture that one of the unarticulated premises of the debate
may be that there ought to be a different approach to intra-class
disputes and inter-class ones. When the investing classes require
help to solve the problems arising out of their relationships to each
other, an approach imposing more direct director responsibility
seems to be readily acceptable. The obverse appears to be true
where the difficulties arise from relationships between the
investing classes and the non-investing ones (such as the clashes
between shareholders and consumers, or between shareholders
and people who just want to enjoy the environment). Here the
position of creditors of the corporation presents a peculiar
problem.
Both the emerging jurisprudence and legislation giving
voluntary creditors more protection, including the right to pursue
actions against directors, are not all that easy to explain within the
context of the legal model of the corporation or from the contrac-
tarian perspective, given that there are no contractual relations
89 See supra, footnote 71.
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between the agent-directors and the creditors. However, from the
perspective that what really is being solved are disputes of an
intra-class nature regardless of the legal niceties, these develop-
ments make functional sense. 90
Similarily, from a class perspective, the debate which has
surrounded the efforts to make directors liable for unpaid wages
can be better understood. From a contractarian point of view,
workers could be characterized as belonging to the nexus of
contracts which makes up the enterprise and, therefore, it could
be argued that they should be given some rights within the enter-
prise. The contractarian and corporate sector opposition to
director responsibility for unpaid wages, therefore, should not be
as strenuous as it has been. 91 From a class analysis perspective,
however, the interests of workers and of their employers, the
investors, remain antagonistic. Thus, the hostile reaction of some
members of the employing classes is not much of a surprise to class
theorists.
Class conflict analysts understand that while, for the good of
capitalism, it is necessary for governments to mediate92 the class
90 Of course, the argument is not that judges and legislators are class theorists, but rather
that the deep structure of capitalism is making itself felt. While this is not the place to
address all the aspects of this argument, note that at the same time as voluntary creditors
are getting more rights vis-A-vis the corporation and its directors, they are also being
saddled with more obligations. Because large providers of debt capital are in a position of
possible control, regulators and courts have been moving to make them responsible for
environmental clean-ups made necessary by the borrowing corporation's conduct; see D.
Saxe, "Throwing The Net Wider: Can Parent Companies and Lenders Be Held Liable
for Contaminated Land?" (1991), 3 Windsor Rev. Leg & Soc. Issues 25; R.M.C.
Holmes, "Receiver's Liability for Environmental Problems in Cleaning-up Contami-
nated Sites: Managing Risk and Responsibility", Toronto, Insight, 1990; S. Cantlie,
"When Words Collide: Environmental Regulation in Conflict with Bankruptcy Legis-
lation" (1993), 2 C.B.L.J. 190; "The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act", 42 U.S.C. ss. 9601 to 9657 ("CERCLA"); R.W.
McGee, "Superfund: It's Time to Repeal after a Decade of Failure" (1993), 76
U.C.L.A., J. Envir. L., 165.
91 For an argument by a working class supporter that the contract nexus theory should give
workers a say in the governance of the corporation, see K. Stone, "Contractual Mecha-
nisms for Protecting Employees with the Nexus-of-Contract Firm" (1993), 43 U.T.L.J.
353. For a contrary interpretation of what the contractarian theory denotes for the rights
of workers, see 0. Williamson, "Corporate Governance" (1984), 93 Yale L. J. 1197.
Alternatively, see R. Howse & M.J. Trebilcock, "Protecting the Employment Bargain"
(1993), 43 U.T.L.J. 751; for an evaluation, see H.J. Glasbeek, "Preliminary Observa-
tions on Strains Of, and Strains In, Corporate Law Scholarship" in F. Pearce & L. Snider
(eds.), Corporate Crime: Ethics, Law and the State (U. of T. Press, forthcoming,
available on request).
92 And perhaps to hide. For an argument about the complex issues raised by the bestowal of
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conflict inherent in employer/employee relationships - a need
which has led, after many political struggles, to sophisticated
collective bargaining schemes, minimum standards legislation and
equality of opportunity movements - individual capitalists do not
find it easy to drop their instinctive antagonism. Employers tend
to resist, therefore, all attempts to make them any more respon-
sible than specific contractual terms of employment make them.
They are happy to leave taxpayers to pick up the social costs
arising out of the displacement of workers when an enterprise
suffers a market downturn.
Ironically, these potential social costs provide regulators, who
already feel a need to act in fulfilment of their role as mediators of
adversary relations, with another motivation to intervene.93 The
fact that legislatures reach out for what seems to be the only
counter-remedy available to them when class conflict becomes
overt - by making the directors of impecunious corporations
responsible for wages owed to employees who are likely to be
thrown onto the unemployment insurance or welfare schemes
funded by the government - is bound to lead to instinctive and
fierce resistance. Yet, it is to be noted that what the state is not
trying to do is to stop employers from making market decisions
about levels of employment. It is trying to influence those
decisions by increasing the cost of dismissal to these decision-
makers because of the potentially destructive social and political
effects they have.
This political spin on the debate leads to a very different set of
understandings than are provided by the self-proclaimed value
free, apolitical arguments which underpin the legal model of
corporate governance or by the law and economics approach to
the issue of directors' responsibilities. In this light, some other
tentative arguments are offered.
One of the effects of both the TSE Task Force's-type
recommendations 94 and of the increasing number of direct
collective rights on workers, see J. Fudge and H.J. Glasbeek, "The Legacy of PC1003"
(forthcoming; available on request); see also my "Law: Real and Ideological Constraints
on the Working Class", in Gibson & Baldwin, eds., Law in a Cynical Society? (Toronto,
Carswell, 1985), p. 282.
93 For an argument that because it is difficult to have workers represented on boards of
directors to enable them to safeguard their interests, the state should pick up the pieces,
see Howse and Trebilcock, supra, footnote 91.
94 Supra, footnote 71.
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statutory obligations imposed on directors is to make for a profes-
sionalization of boards of directors. While directors, especially of
large, widely held corporations, undoubtedly have always prided
themselves on their experience, expertise and business "smarts",
the level of skill, care and diligence required of them by the legal
model of the corporation until recently has been appallingly low.
While many reasons may be offered for this, only one possibility
needs to be considered in this context.
It may be that, in large part, the resentment of statutorily
imposed obligations on directors, including external directors,
arises from the fact that this set of requirements causes them to be
treated as if they were mere employees. The shareholders' agents
who are managers and officers of the corporation more clearly
approximate people who satisfy the definition of employees than
do directors. Until now, the latter have been seen as special kinds
of shareholder-agents. While, legally and traditionally, they have
been primarily responsible to the investing classes, in practice they
also have been members of those investing classes. Consequently,
their legally required tasks and duties were more like those of
part-time functionaries, almost dilettantish, at least in law.
95
Now it looks as if the role of directors might be changing. They
will be working harder for the investors who have chosen them,
and they will be less equal to them. 96 Inasmuch as giving profes-
sional-type service to the investing class always has been
acceptable to many senior managers of corporations (that is, high
level employees who serve on other corporations' boards of
directors), the proposed upgrading of these kinds of duties may be
relatively acceptable to many directors. This is not likely to be the
case in respect of the proposals to enlarge the scope of their
responsibilities to look after the interests of the "other" classes.
It may be the case that, when it is argued that there will be a
dearth of competent directors if these personal responsibilities of
directors to the outside world are not curtailed, what really is
being talked about is that owners of wealth and their allies may not
95 This is what used to cause them be described as "parsley on the fish", an expression
attributed to Irving Olds, chairman of U.S. Steel, 1940-1952.
96 Note here that, to contractarians, directors were never truly equal because they were
agents for the shareholders/principals. For the legal model of governance theory, on the
other hand (which provides the basis for the relatively low standard of care of these
agents), they are characterized as having a great deal of autonomy, as befits non-
employees who are both representatives and members of the investing classes.
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take kindly to being asked to serve better "the adversary" (that is,
members of the other class). While this kind of theorizing yields
the same conclusion (that is, a likely increase in the reluctance of
qualified people to serve as directors) as the efficiency-based
argument, it is of a totally different kind and, therefore, presents
different questions for theorists and policy-makers when looking
for a solution to the supposedly looming problem of an unwill-
ingness by the captains of industry to serve the wealth-owning
classes.
VI. SUMMARY
The debate around directors' responsibilities is framed by a set
of assumptions from which flow certain consequences.
(i) Canada is a liberal democracy. It believes in the political
equality of all individuals, individuals who should be free to
exercise their will as they see fit, subject only to democratically
agreed-upon restrictions.
(ii) Canada is also a liberal democratic capitalist nation which
believes in the sovereignty of individuals who should be left as free
as possible to deploy their own resources and abilities to maximize
their economic opportunities.
(iii) Canada is a mature liberal capitalist democracy. Over time,
governments, which have accepted that overall welfare should
primarily be created by individual actors who are left alone to
advance their own position, have facilitated such private wealth
creation. The corporation, the chief facilitating device, has
become the key to Canada's economy.
(iv) Governments see it as their role to perfect the market, as
well as to facilitate market activities. This means the removal of
unnatural market barriers, of information blockages, of unfair
forms of competition, etc. It also requires the setting up of
regulatory regimes which internalize costs where this cannot be
done easily by private actors in the market.
(v) In this kind of economy, individual actors are to depend on
themselves. They need to be selfish and, because resources are
unequally divided, some of the outcomes of the market become
socially unacceptable, even if the government works hard to
overcome some market frictions and imperfections. This means
that, in the political sphere, where economically disadvantaged
people may have more clout, democratic, electoral rights are used
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to have governments change unacceptable outcomes. At the same
time as this may diminish some of the opportunities for wealth-
owners to profit, it may make the economic system more palatable
and give the political system more credibility.
(vi) The ensuing rules and regulations impose restraints on
individual actors who, in a political economy of this kind, are
expected to be responsible for self-optimalizing conduct which
violates these legal standards of conduct.
(vii) The corporation has become the principal tool in private
economic welfare creation because it is an attractive way to
aggregate capital and to organize production. Two features,
separate legal personality and limited liability, have been very
useful to these ends. As a practical matter, these very features,
however, put the investors outside the reach of the rules and
regulations which are meant to fetter individuals. On the face of it,
this runs counter to the basic tenet that individuals should be
responsible for the conduct which they initiate. Further, as these
rules and regulations are seen to be necessary to a well-working
liberal democratic market system, there is a need to find an alter-
native way to enforce them; new targets have to be found.
(viii) Statutory corporate law suggests that the corporation
and/or governors of the corporation could be appropriate targets.
Statutorily mandated directors are the legal governors of the
corporation. While the theory of legal personality creates some
problems for making directors responsible, it is possible to do so
without undermining the understandings of the corporation which
underlie the business corporations statutes.
(ix) There is an argument that this will adversely affect the very
efficiency which the corporate vehicle provides. Law and
economics scholars argue for enterprise, rather than personal,
liability, lest directors/managers of the corporation become too
afraid to take necessary risks on behalf of the shareholders/-
owners. This could kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.
(x) This argument depends on the fact that, as Rational
Economic Men, shareholders will react to enterprise liability by
exercising better control of the directors/managers and that this
control will be imposed at a lower cost, that is, it will be more
efficient, than other means used to achieve legislatively prescribed
political/legal goals. Such an argument is an amalgam of
theoretical and empirical presuppositions. It is far from conclusive
and raises the question as to why it is made with such vigour.
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(xi) Much of the difficulty may stem from the non-questioning
of the assumption that Canada is a liberal capitalist democracy, as
opposed to a class-divided society in which relatively few
dominant wealth owners seek to exploit non-wealth owners and
resources to further their private accumulation endeavours.
Adherence to the assumption that this is a liberal capitalist
democratic polity means that the political and economic spheres,
while seen to be related, are treated as essentially discrete spheres,
one in which the political is superior to the economic. In mature
democratic liberalism, the political institutions can, and should,
determine the boundaries of the economic ones. In contrast, from
a class analysis point of view, there is a limit to which the political
institutions can be allowed to determine the economic ones. To
this kind of analytical understanding, the crucial point is that the
economic sphere, in the end, determines the nature and scope of
the political sphere and its institutions. This approach, which
seems not to be part of the theoretical/policy debates, does have
explanatory force for some of the key issues in the controversy. In
particular, it helps to explain why some of the extensions of
directors' responsibility seem to be acceptable to proponents of
the status quo, while other extensions strike horror in the hearts of
those who defend the private accumulation process.
